INTRODUCTION
Cognitive psychology has traditionally been a psychology of the individual, seeking to delineate the processes by which individual minds perceive, manip ulate, and interpret information. Initially applied to artificial and puzzle-like tasks, cognitive theories have increasingly sought to explain more complex, ill-structured, and "real world" forms of cognitive activity. But even as explan atory ambitions have expanded, the standard metaphors (some treat them as true models) for problem solving and other forms of complex "higher-order" cognitive activity have been the rule-based theories of artificial intelligence in the Newell & Simon (1972) tradition. The rise of blackboard models and connectionist theories (Rummelhart et al 1986) has provided new and enrich ing metaphors, such as the "society of mind" (Minsky 1986 ), but the focus has remained on the individual as a solitary and, for the most part, purely intellec tive being. Although cognitive psychology ' s increasing engagement with com plex tasks has pressed the field toward a consideration of the context uf problem solving as an important element in cognition, little attention has been paid to intentions, motivations, social interpretations, or cognitive functioning in interaction with others.
A continuing debate among cognitive psychologists concerns the relative importance of general processes (sometimes called "skills") versus domain specific knowledge in generating competent performance. Most now agree that "experts" in a domain are characterized by large pools of quickly accessi ble and highly specific knowledge, that general skills and domain-specific knowledge can to some degree compensate for one another, and that general skills are "weak" compared to domain-specific knowledge but are nonetheless crucial in allowing for novel performances.
Recognition of the importance of domain-specific knowledge took the cog nitive psychologist on a first step toward eventual inclusion of social factors as part of cognition. This first step did not specifically implicate social factors but did highlight how particular, how situated, cognition always is. In practice, what qualifies as domain-specific is extremely dependent on particulars of the situation-what questions are asked in the experiment, for example, and what other information is given. That, in turn, makes it necessary to attend not only to knowledge elements but also to the conditions of their use-the situations in which cognition takes place.
This focus on situations leads the investigator away from the traditional site of cognitive research, the laboratory where a subject works alone at an experi menter-defined task, to various sites familiar to applied psychologists-the family, the classroom, the playground, and the workplace. At each of these Annu. Rev. Psychol. 1993.44:585-612 . Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org by University of Michigan on 08/31/09. For personal use only.
sites one finds a complex social environment containing multiple actors, each with his or her own intentions and interpretations of the situation, who influ ence one another's knowledge, opinions, and values, and who interact to produce shared cognitive products. This increased interest in situated, or con textualized, cognition has led cognitive scientists to recognize the importance of relations among cognition, motivation, and broader processes of social influence and engagement. Recent work on such topics as mood and memory (Bower 1981) , attribution and memory (e.g. Johnson & Sherman 1990) , and transfer of situated learning (Greeno et al 1992) reflects this growing interest in socially situated cognitions. In this chapter we develop a point of view that treats cognition as a funda mentally social activity. In so doing, we expand and elaborate our previous ideas about "socially shared cognition" and the "social science of cognition" (Higgins 1992b) . Much of the research we discuss here was conducted by social psychologists, and some of it falls under the heading of "social cognition." Critics sometimes complain that the field of social cognition is nothing more than "cognitive psychology with social objects." The implication is that social cognition researchers simply borrow cognitive psychology models originally developed for nonsocial objects and then test their generalizability to social objects. But, as Higgins (l992b) has argued, several cognitive models originated by social psychologists are applicable to cognition in general. These include models of attribution processes, salience effects, knowledge accessibility, and inference and decision making.
Of particular interest in the search for social foundations of cognition is the interface between cognition and motivation (see Higgins & Sorrentino 1990) . Cognition as a source of motivation was a fundamental issue in social psychol ogy during the late 1950s and 19 60s, as exemplified in various cognitive consistency models (see Abelson et a1 1968, for a review) and in the informa tion transmission approach to attitude formation and change (see McGuire 1969) . In addition, work by investigators interested in social development (e.g. Dweck & Bempechat 1983; Nicholls 1983) has shown how different self-attri butions can motivate different forms of cognitive behavior, demonstrating how motivation can affect the form and substance of cognition as well as the amount of cognitive effort exerted.
Investigators from several disciplines outside psychology are also contrib uting to our understanding of cognition as a social process. These include anthropologists, who are studying how knowledge and skills are transmitted in traditional cultures and defining the cognitive foundations of cultural differ ences, and ethnomethodologists, who are investigating the structure of com munication and language.
In this chapter, we ignore the boundaries of disciplines and subfields, focusing instead on substantive questions that seem central in understanding cognition as a social process. We are less concerned with evaluating the empirical support for various theories than with presenting ideas that have Annu. Rev. Psychol. 1993.44:585-612 . Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org by University of Michigan on 08/31/09. For personal use only.
heuristic utility for an emerging field of inquiry, and we arc illustrative rather than exhaustive in citing relevant research.
We consider five ways in which social factors influence both the content of people's cognitions and thc processes by which cognitive activities proceed. In the first four sections, we focus primarily on how individual cognition is affected by social factors. Here our emphasis is on "social action" in Max
Weber's (1967) sense, namely that the meaning people assign to events is transformed because their actions take others into account. In the fifth section, the cognitive and the social are fused. There we challenge the assumption that cognition is exclusively an individual act, clearly distinguishable from external social processes that may influence it. We explore the proposition that the social and the cognitive are more intimately intertwined than psychologists have typically assumed and that much thinking must be understood as a form of social interaction. In so doing, we review work that treats the social unit (Le.
the dyad or group), rather than the individual, as the focus of analysis.
MERE PRESENCE OF OTHERS
The most rudimentary way in which social factors influence cognition is via the simple presence of other people. Even when their responses are neither observed nor cognitively represented and there is no opportunity for interac tion, the fact that others are physicall y present can affect a person's cognitive activity, sometimes facilitating and sometimes impeding it.
Social Facilitation
Two of the earliest experiments in social psychology (Triplett 1898; Meumann 1904 , cited by Cottrell 1972 demonstrated that the presence of either co-ac tors or a passive audience can enhance performance. These social-facilitation effects elicited a good deal of research attention, but by the early 1960s a confusing picture had emerged. Some studies confirmcd that thc mere prcs ence of others enhanced performance; others found that passive audiences and co-actors impeded performance. Zajonc (1965) (198 6 ) had subjects type their own names, either as they nonnally appear (a simple task) or backwards with ascending numbers interspersed among the letters (a difficult task). In the "alone" condi tion, subjects worked by themselves; in the "mere presence" condition, they worked in a room with another person who wore a blindfold and earphones.
Performance times were faster for the simple task and slower for the difficult task in the mere presence than in the alone condition.
Baron (19 86) has proposed an alternative to Zajonc's drive theory based on the idea that the presence of others is a distraction, which leads to attentional conflict. This conflict produces cognitive overload and selective focusing of attention, which causes either performance decrements or increments, depend ing on the infonnation-processing demands of the task (e.g. SOCIAL FOUNDA nONS 59 1 neous than the outgroup (Higgins & King 1981; Mullen 1991) . For example, compared to majority members of groups, "token" and minority members (e.g.
women in predominantly male groups) attract more attention from others (Lord & Saenz 1985; Taylor et al 1978) and are more aware of the characteris tics that distinguish them from others (Cota & Dion 1986; McGuire & Padawer-Singer 1976 ; see also Frable et al 1990) . This visibility, in turn, can distract token members from their task and thereby interfere with their perfor mance (Lord & Saenz 1985) . 
SOCIAL ROLES , POSITIONS , AND IDENTITIES

Social Roles
As defined by Sarbin & Allen (1968) , role expectations "are comprised of the rights and privileges, the duties and obligations, of any occupant of a social position in relation to persons occupying other positions in the social struc ture" (p. 497). When a person adopts a role, his or her behavior is constrained by the expectations associated with the role. In addition, the person's cogni tions are often influenced by these expectations and the role enactments they elicit.
In an early study of the impact of role enactment on cognition, Jones & deCharms (1958) had subjects listen to an interview between a psychologist and an ex-prisoner of war who had signed propaganda statements during captivity. Subjects were assigned different roles vis-a-vis the ex-prisoner (i.e.
member of a judicial board of inquiry, member of a medical-psychological board, potential friend). Results indicated that subjects' attributions of the target's personality characteristics varied markedly depending on the role they were assigned. More recent studies provide additional evidence for the impact of role enactment on cognitions. For example, Anderson & Pichert (1978) found that subjects' assignment to the role of home buyer versus burglar influenced their memory for the properties of a house that they read about.
And Zukier & Pepitone (1984) found that assignment to the role of scientist versus clinical counselor influenced subjects' use of base rate information in evaluating a target person. Social Positions "Social positions" are defined as socially recognized categories of actors. When a positional category is assigned to a person, the individual is expected to possess particular attributes and is responded to on the assumption that he or she has these attributes (see Stryker & Statham 1985) . Whereas some social positions are social roles, which involve normative expectations regarding appropriate behavior and sanctions for violating these expectations, other so cial positions simply involve probabilistic expectancies about how a person "will" (as opposed to "should") behave. The latter type of social position, like the former type discussed above, can inf luence cognitive activity. An interesting consequence of assigning a person to a social position occurs when (a) the individual is assumed to possess certain characteristics that he or she does not possess, (b) others treat the person as though he or she possesses these characteristics, and (c) this treatment causes the person to exhibit the very characteristics he or she was (incorrectly) assumed to possess in the first place. These "self-fulfilling prophecies" (Merton 1957 ) have at least two kinds of cognitive consequences. Dispositional inferences (e.g. industrious, aggressive) can also be treated as social positions if these terms are used to identify individuals who share similar characteristics that distinguish them from people in general. These dispositional inferences can have a major impact on subsequent information processing (for reviews, see Higgins & Stangor 1988; Wyer & Srull1989) .
Social Identities
As suggested above, people who are assigned to social positions by others sometimes internalize these positional designations and come to view them selves as the others view them (see Stryker & Statham 1985) . Such internal ized designations are called "social identities." It is important to note that, although social roles often become social identities, these two types of social positions are conceptually distinct. A person can enact a particular role but not identify with it (e.g. because role performance is forced by external pressure), and a person can identify with a social position (e.g. being short) that does not involve any role responsibilities.
Activation of a social identity can influence both behavior and cognition. For example, Charters & Newcomb (1952) increased the salience of Catholic students' religious identity by emphasizing the common religious identifica tion of everyone in the room and found that this identity activation caused Annu. Rev. Psychol. 1993.44:585-612 . Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org by University of Michigan on 08/31/09. For personal use only.
students' opinions to shift toward orthodox Catholic beliefs. Frable et al (1990) found that individuals who have social identities that are statistically rare and socially important (e.g. bisexual, wealthy) are more "mindful" during a dyadic interaction than are their "normal" partners, recalling more detailed information and taking their partner' s perspective. Finally, socially categoriz ing another person as an ingroup versus an outgroup member can substantially affect how this person is perceived and treated (see, for example, Messick & Mackie 1989; Wilder 1986 ).
MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS OF OTHERS
In many cases, an individual who is not in the physical presence of others has knowledge about their responses or expects to learn about these responses in the future. These mental representations of others can have important effects on the in dividual' s cognitions.
Role-Taking
The ability to take the roles of others is critical to effective role enactment (Mead 1934; Sarbin & Allen 1968) . Situational role-taking involves "putting yourself in someone else's shoes" and inferring how you would respond if you were in the other person's situation. Individual role-taking involves "seeing the world through someone else's eyes" and inferring how the other person would respond if he or she were in the same situation as you (Higgins 1981 b) .
Role-taking ability shows systematic developmental shifts with age (see Flavell et al 1968; Higgins 1981b ). As they mature, children become more adept at shifting perspective when asked to process identical input from differ ent viewpoints; older (but not younger) children can represent events differ ently as a function of the perspective they are asked to adopt (Feffer 19 70).
Developmental and individual differences in role-taking appear to underlie differences in interpersonal sensitivity, social maturity, and pro social behavior (Moore & Underwood 1981; Selman 1980) .
Reference Groups and Individuals
Individuals' opinions are often influenced by the assumed opinions of groups they deem important. The critical role that reference groups play in social influence has been recognized for some time (see Singer 1981) . A reference group may or may not be a membership group-people are sometimes formal members of groups with which they identify and sometimes not. In addition, people are motivated to meet the standards of some (positi ve) reference groups and to violate those of other (ncgative) refercnce groups. Siegcl & Siegel (1957) found that both reference groups and membership groups influenced the authoritarianism of students' attitudes. And Carver & Humphries (1981) found that students who associated an opinion with a negative reference group Annu. Rev. Psychol. 1993.44:585-612 . Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org by University of Michigan on 08/31/09. For personal use only.
showed less agreement with this position than did students who did not make this association. Recent research shows that people's susceptibility to social influence de pends on their self-categorization as members of a particular group and their conformity to the norms defining that group (Turner & Oakes 1989) People are also influenced by the assumed responses of reference individu als (cf Elkind 1967) . For example, several theorists have argued that social facilitation effects are not due to others' "mere presence" but rather to anxiety about how the others will evaluate one's performance (see Geen 1989 for a review of evaluation apprehension and self-presentation theories of social facilitation). And Baldwin et al (1990) have shown that students' evaluations of their own research ideas can be influenced by evoked representations of approving or disapproving faculty members.
Social Comparison
People's self-perceptions and evaluations are influenced by comparing them selves to others, even when no evaluation by these others is expected. Al though knowledge about others' characteristics and performances is some times obtained from direct observation, often this knowledge is acquired from third parties (e.g. newspaper writers, mutual acquaintances). In both cases, comparison targets typically do not intend to influence the observer and may not even know that a comparison is taking place. . Several trends in contemporary social comparison research suggest links between social and cognitive processes. For example, current research demonstrates that social comparison is itself a cognitive process, in which people actively select comparison targets and construct and distort comparison information to serve their goals. Thus, people sometimes imagine comparison targets who do not exist (e.g. hypothetical others who are worse off than they are) and select comparison dimensions that are likely to satisfy their goals (e.g. dimensions on which they are likely to be superior to others) (e.g. Wood & Taylor 1991) . In addition, current investigations emphasize the cognitive consequences of receiving information indicating that one is supe rior or inferior to others. These consequences include changes in outcome Annu. Rev. Psychol. 1993.44:585-612 . Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org by University of Michigan on 08/31/09. For personal use only.
expectations and self-efficacy as well as in achievement striving (e.g. Major et alI991).
Anticipated Interactions with Others
When people expect to interact with others, they often prepare by engaging in ing to intcract with a target person, compared with not expecting to do so, produces better recall of information about the person, more individuation of the person in memory, and more accurate name-to-item associations for the person.
SOCIAL INTERACTION AND COGNITIVE CHANGE
Two influential thinkers, Mead (1934) and Vygotsky (1978) , have proposed that people's fundamental capaciti es for thinking, as well as the forms their thinking takes, are created in socially shared cognitive activities. Mead called thought "conversation with the generalized other," suggesting that private thinking is an internalized version of the process of challenge, justification, and revision of ideas that first occurs during argumentation with others (see Hilton 1991 for a theory of how everyday causal explanations are grounded in conversational processes). Except for those interested in interpersonal commu nication, Mead has been largely ignored by students of cognition. In contrast, Vygotsky, who had similar ideas about thought as internalization of social practice, has profoundly influenced theories of cognitive development. Even biologically oriented developmental theorists, such as Piaget (1950; see also Gelman & Carey 1991), who attribute cognitive development to children's private mental work in grappling with the events and objects in their environ ments, acknowledge that certain kinds of social interactions stimulate mental effort and promote cognitive change. In addition, within social psychology, work on social influence and group participation also stresses the ways cogni tive challenges from others can produce elaborations in individual thinking. . These investigators assume that social interac tion can produce intellectual development if socio-cognitive conflict is gener ated and resolved. Socio-cognitive conflict occurs when individuals have dif ferent responses to the same problem and are motivated to achieve a joint solution. The intellectual development produced by socio-cognitive conflict reflects extensive cognitive restructuring rather than mere imitation, as indi cated by subjects' ability to generalize responses from one domain to another, to employ novel arguments that were not mentioned during interaction, and to profit from interaction with peers at the same or lower levels of cognitive development. Evidence suggests that the impact of conflict resolution on intel lectual progress is influenced by the intensity and social significance of the Annu. Rev. Psychol. 1993.44:585-612 
Conflict as a Source of Cognitive Growth
Majority and Minority Influence
The stimulative effect of interpersonal disagreement on individual mental activity can be seen in research on majority and minority influence. Beginning with Asch (1951), researchers have sought to understand majority influence, or conformity, by clarifying the circumstances under which people who hold a minority position in a group adopt the position held by the majority (see reviews by Allen 1965; Levine & Russo 1987). More recently, beginning with Moscovici (Moscovici & Faucheux 1972) , investigators have tried to under stand minority influence, or innovation, by clarifying the conditions under which people holding a majority position adopt the minority position (see reviews by Kruglanski & Mackie 1990; Levine 1989; Moscovici 1985) .
An important question regarding both conformity and innovation is whether the position change resulting from disagreement represents public agreement (compliance) or private agreement (conversion). Moscovici (1980 Moscovici ( , 1985 has argued that minorities have their primary impact on conversion, whereas majorities have their primary impact on compliance. Evidence regard ing minority influence is consistent with this argument, but data regarding majority influence are not as clear (Maass & Clark 1984; Maass et al 1987; Mackie 1987) .
From the perspective of socially influenced cognition, conversion is more interesting than compliance. As suggested above, conversion is often defined as private movement toward the influence source's position (e.g. agreement with other group members even though they cannot see one's responses). In addition, conversion is sometimes defined as delayed change, which occurs after the influence source is no longer present, and as indirect change, which occurs on related issues that were not mentioned by the source (Moscovici 1980; Mugny & Perez 1991) . A particularly interesting, though controversial, indication of conversion involves changes in chromatic afterim-ages following exposure to minority responses suggesting that a stimulus of one color is actually another color (e.g. Moscovici & Personnaz 1986 ; but see Sorrentino et al 1980) . This kind of basic perceptual change, when subjects are unaware of the physical laws relating visual images and afterimages, suggests that social influence may sometimes be powerful enough to affect perceptual processes normally considered to be purely physiological. Why does exposure to disagreement from others (particularly minorities) produce these cognitive changes? Moscovici (1980 Moscovici ( , 1985 argues that minori ties trigger a "validation" process involving attention to the minority's position and cognitive activity about this position. Nemeth (1986) Nemeth & Kwan asked subjects to name words embedded in letter strings and informed them that either a majority or a minority of other group members adopted a nonobvious, or dissenting, strategy (i.e. reading the letters back ward). When subsequently asked to form all the words they could from several letter strings, subjects ex.posed to minority dissent used more strategies (for ward, backward, mixed) and therefore detected more words than did subjects exposed to majority dissent. These results suggest that a minority can some times stimulate more "advanced" cognitive responses than those exhibited in its own behavior. We saw similar effects in the work on socio-cognitive conflict discussed above.
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Group Decision Making
Most studies of majority and minority influence do not involve explicit pres sure on group members to reach a joint decision. However, such pressure is a defining characteristic of research on group decision making. Although the goal of group decision making is to arrive at a consensual judgment superior to the judgments of individual members, participation in this collective activity can have important cognitive consequences for group members. (We discuss group decision making as ajoint cognitive activity below.)
One cognitive consequence for the individual is private opinion change in the direction of the group's final position (e.g. Sande & Zanna 1987) . It is generally assumed that such change is more likely if the person is yielding to "informational" rather than "normative" pressure (Deutsch & Gerard 1955) . In their work on mock jury deliberations, Stasser & Davis (1981) concluded that changes in members ' (private) certainty levels were primarily attributable to informational influence, whereas changes in their (public) verdict preferences were due to normative as well as informational influence (see Stasser et al 1989 for a discussion of consensus models and group decision making). Kaplan (1987) has discussed several variables that increase the probability of informational influence (and hence private opinion change) during group deci sion making. These include an intellective (factual) issue, private responses, and desire to obtain a correct decision. Although the cognitive mechanisms underlying nonnative and informational influence are not well understood, the power of informational influence to produce private opinion change may be due, at least in part, to the validation process that Moscovici believes is responsible for conversion to minority opinions.
Other research suggests t h at engaging in group decision making can lead individuals to adopt the problem-solving strategies that the group used. For example, Laughlin and his colleagues (e.g. Laughlin & Ellis 1986) have dem onstrated specific group-to-individual transfer on the same type of problem that the group worked on, whereas Stasson et al (1991) have demonstrated general transfer on different but related problems. And people who work together to resolve "judgment policy" conflicts (regarding how probabilistic cues should be weighted and combined in making inferential judgments) and who receive feedback regarding the correct answer show convergence in their judgment policies, although disagreements often continue because of inconsis tent application of these policies (Brehmer 1984; Cook & Hammond 1982) .
COGNITION AS COLLABORATION
Outside the laboratory and the school, cognition is almost always collaborative (Resnick 1987) . At work and in civic and personal life, each person's ability to function successfully depends upon coordinated cognitive interactions with others, and the cognitive "products" that emerge from these interactions canAnnu. Rev. Psychol. 1993.44:585-612 . Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org by University of Michigan on 08/31/09. For personal use only.
not be attributed to single individuals. In studying joint cognition, it is critical to examine both the process and outcomes of cognitive collaboration, treating the group or the dyad, rather than the individual, as the primary unit of analysis.
Development of Shared Cognitions in Groups
Coordinated cognitive activity depends upon intersubjectivity (Ickes et al 1990; Rommetveit 1979) -that is, a shared understanding of what is being discussed or worked on. Intersubjectivity, although an intuitively appealing concept, is difficult to operationalize. Its presence is typically inferred from successful coordination of activity by dyad or group members, rather than from direct measurement. Some research, however, has explicitly examined the extent to which shared cognitions are developed by group members.
A classic example is Sherif' s (1935) research on norm formation in groups. Sherif investigated how people come to share common perceptions of an ambiguous perceptual stimulus, namely the apparent movement of a stationary point of light in an otherwise dark room (the autokinetic effect). The judg ments of individual group members converged until a shared estimate of the light's direction and distance of movement was attained, and this socially developed norm continued to influence members' judgments when they later responded alone. Subsequent work has indicated that, once established, such a norm is often maintained over several "generations" during which old mem bers gradually leave the group and new members join (Jacobs & Campbell 1961; Weick & Gilfillan 1971) . Going beyond perceptual norms, a large body of work indicates that a group's efforts to transmit its norms are particularly strong when newcomers are involved (Levine & Moreland 1991; Moreland & Levine 1989) . Groups are highly motivated to provide newcomers with the knowledge, ability, and motivation they will need to play the role of full member (e.g. Van Maanen & Schein 1979; Wanous 1980) . Newcomers are typically receptive to these influence attempts because they feel a strong need to learn what is expected of them (e.g. Louis 1980; Van Maanen 1977) .
To the extent that socially shared cognitions are developed during group interaction, we might expect groups to perform better than individuals on various tasks, including learning and concept attainment, creativity, and prob lem solving. However, this often is not the case (Hill 1982) . In a review of research on individual versus group accuracy in judgment tasks, Hastie (1986) concluded that the relative performance of individuals and groups depends heavily on the task. On numerical estimation tasks, group judgment is slightly superior to the average individual judgment. On other tasks (e.g. logical and mathematical brainteaser problems), group judgment is better than the average individual judgment and worse than the best individual judgment, except on "Eureka" problems, where group performance tends to equal that of the most competent member. These findings suggest that "solution demonstrability" is Annu. Rev. Psychol. 1993.44:585-612 . Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org by University of Michigan on 08/31/09. For personal use only.
the critical determinant of a group's ability to develop an adequate shared representation, with groups performing best when the task has a correct solu tion that can be readily demonstrated and communicated to members (cf Laughlin & Ellis 1986). Information exchange is an important determinant of the effectiveness of joint decision making (e.g . Vinokur et al 1985) . However, recent work by Stasser (1992) indicates that groups often do not exchange all the information available to their members. Rather than disseminating unshared information, group discussion tends to be dominated by information that members initially share and that supports their initial preferences.
This overreliance on shared information points to the negative conse quences of too much intersubjectivity, which can prevent groups from fully exploiting lhe cognitive re sources of their members (cf Levine & Moreland 1991 ). An extreme example of this phenomenon is "groupthink," which is defined as extreme concurrence-seeking that produces poor group decisions. Janis (1982) argued that factors such as external threat, high group cohesive ness, and directive leadership produce symptoms of groupthink (e.g. illusions of invulnerability, pressure on dissenters), which in turn undermine members' ability to process information and arrive at sound group decisions (see also McCauley 1989) . In a similar vein, Hutchins (1991) , using connectionist mod els of group and individual thinking, showed how the initial distribution of information in a group, together with the patterns of communication among members and the decision rules for integrating information, can either exacer bate or ameliorate problems that exist in individual cognitive systems (e.g. confirmation bias) (see also Tindale 1993 ).
An ostensible outcome of groupthink is the tendency for groups to pursue unduly risky courses of action. Evidence suggests that, at least under certain circumstances, groups do indeed make decisions more extreme than the aver age of members' initial positions (e.g. Isenberg 1986) . A popular explanation for these group choice shifts (and for group polarization, or the tendency for individuals' opinions to become more extreme after discussion) is persuasive arguments theory (Burnstein & Sentis 1981) . According to this theory, choice shifts occur when people are exposed to novel and persuasive arguments supporting the side they already favor.
The ways groups develop shared cognitions during interaction have also been examined by Hastie & Pennington (1991) in their studies of jury decision making. They found that jurors' demographic characteristics (e.g. gender, age, socioeconomic status) influenced how much they talked during deliberation, that jurors used various social-influence tactics to reach consensus (e.g. factual arguments, appeals to values, direct rewards and punishments), and that juries tended to use one of two deliberation styles--evidence-driven or verdict driven-to decide cases. Hastie & Pennington's analysis highlights the need to study how a shared interpretation of events is negotiated among individuals (and factions) who have different views of reality.
Group Memory
As the research on groupthink and confirmation bias suggests, maximum intersubjectivity, with all group members possessing exactly the same knowl edge and thinking exactly the same way, often fails to capitalize on the total cognitive resources of the group. To ameliorate this problem, groups often evolve mechanisms for distributing cognitive responsibilities, thereby creating an expanded and more efficient cognitive system. Wegner (1987) consensus favoring a response alternative, the correctness of the alternative, and members' confidence in their responses (Hinsz 1990 ). & Brennan 1991) have argued that grounding activities are determined by the principle of "least collaborative effort" and that these activities change with both the purpose of the conversation (e.g. identify referents vs register verba tim content) and the medium of the conversation (e.g. fac e-to-face vs elec tronic mail).
Communication and Linguistic Interaction
The importance of the communication medium is also being recognized in the growing body of work on distributed cognition and collaborative mental work (e.g. Galegher et al 1990; Resnick et al 1992; Suchman 1987 Although some might claim that the brain as the physical site of mental processing requires that we treat cognition as a fundamentally individual and even private activity, we are prepared to argue that all mental activity-from perceptual recognition to memory to problem solving-involves either repre sentations of other people or the use of artifacts and cultural forms that have a social history. Our attention to linguistic processes in cognitive collaboration brings into focus the extent to which cultural inheritances shape even individ ual cognitive activity (cf Wertsch 1985) . The rules of pragmatic discourse (cf Austin 1962; Grice 1975; Searle 1969) vary from culture to culture, as does the vocabulary available for expressing ideas. Other inherited tools, such as scien tific instruments and theories, also embody accepted ways of thinking (cf Latour 1987) and thus invisibly shape the course of both individual and group cognitive activity.
Culture, which includes the ways of thought, tools, and artifacts of a group of people, is both socially constructed and socially transmitted (Shweder 199 1) . It carries the past history of a group into the present and therefore influences how group members understand their social, physical, and spiritual worlds. This point has been powerfully elaborated by Cole (1988; Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition 1983) and others representing what is called the sociocultural perspective on cognition (Greenfield 1984; Lave 1988) . A related idea is Moscovici's theory of social rep resentations, which are mental schemata or images that people use when making attributions and causal explanations (see Farr & Moscovici 1984; von Cranach et al 1992) . As Potter & Wetherell (1987) suggest, social representations are "social" in at least three senses: (a) they originate in social interaction and communication, (b) they provide a consensual code that facilitates communication, and (c) they provide a means of distinguishing between social groups.
In the messy "real world" it is difficult to imagine any situation that is purely cognitive-devoid of emotions, social meanings, social intentions, and social residues in the form of inherited roles and tools. Indeed, the drive to understand cognition in everyday use has stimulated the interest of cognitive psychologists in social processes. Some of the lines of sociocognitive research and theory discussed in this chapter have begun to penetrate everyday contexts in another way. Several techniques have been developed to exploit social relationships as tools for enhancing learning and performance in school and non school settings (see Weinstein 199 1) . Two important techniques are peer tutoring (allen 1976; Cohen et al 1982) and cooperative learning (Bossert 1988; Slavin 1983 Lave & Wenger 1991; Newman et al 1989; and Rogoff 1990) . Central to all of these efforts is the notion of learning as apprenticeship (cf Col1ins et al 1989) . For example, Rogoff (1990) uses apprenticeship theory in analyzing how children acquire cognitive skil1s, such as memory and planning, during interactions with adults and peers. Lave (1988) gives less attention to the instructional aspects of interaction and more attention to how apprentices acquire knowledge and skills by actively participating in socially valued pro duction activities with more experienced workers. Her analysis emphasizes the linkages between acquiring cognitive skills and developing an identity as a member of a social community.
This work on situated cognition and education is testimony to how engage ment with real-world problems can blur disciplinary boundaries as well as the formerly sharp distinction between cognition and social behavior. This blur ring is welcome because of the theoretical advances it allows. Two historical examples illustrate the theoretical benefits of taking social processes seriously in studying cognition: Efforts to account for the role of social factors in recall led to Bartlett's (1932) theory of reconstructive memory, and work on how social values affect perception led to Bruner's (1957) concept of accessibility.
As the field of sociocognition develops and new conceptions of the relation ship between individual and collective cognition emerge, fundamental ad vances in both social and cognitive sciences are likely. 
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